**MEMORANDUM** 

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
Outside system

July 26, 1971

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR PLUS

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

Harold H. Saunder

Samuel M. Hoskinson

SUBJECT: Interim Message to Sadat

I understand that you have asked what "interim message" was sent to President Sadat on July 13. (Tab A)

About a week after Bergus and Sterner saw Sadat they sensed a "growing impatience" by Sadat to get on with the next steps of the new effort to produce an interim settlement. Sisco, therefore, instructed them to pass on to Sadat the word that:

- --Sadat's response to the Bergus-Sterner approach had been regarded as "positive," reviewed at a "high level" and was helpful in planning our next move.
- --We still were planning "intensive, in-depth talks with the Israelis as the next step, including a possible Sisco trip."
- -- The final decision on Sisco's trip and its timing would be made "in a matter of days" and that we would inform Sadat of the precise timing.

The "interim message" (Tab B) was this effort to keep Sadat in a holding pattern until you returned and an NSC meeting could be held.

DOS, NSS review completed.

What in God's name was be faing to de?

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SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR PLUS

THE WHITE HOUSE

HAT Sunder Spend. Do you know. Dair let state June we have June we have.

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"After Sterner and I delivered interim message to Heykal today (13th) re interim arrangement, Heykal launched into almost an hour's conversation re Egyptian relations with Soviets.

"Soviets, according to Heykal, are still not satisfied with Egyptian position and attitude. They do not think treaty is enough. They believe some heads must roll in Egypt before Soviet position is secure. They are gunning particularly for Heykal. They have complained that Bergus is senior CIA agent in Egypt and has successfully recruited Heykal. Czech Embassy in Cairo has distributed clandestine leaflet attacking "reactionary elements" in Egypt and pointing finger at Heykal.

"Heykal said Soviet delegation to upcoming Revolution Day ceremonies will be headed by Ponamarev. Ponamarev has asked to spend a full day with Heykal for a mutual sizing up process.

"Part of problem, said Heykal, is that persons implicated in attempt May 13 coup were willing to sell themselves to USSR in order to gain power in Egypt. There were elements in USSP who had indicated readiness to cooperate with Cairo plotters on this basis.

"Heykal then pulled from his desk a red leather-bound memo book which he said was written in Sami Sharaf's own handwriting. It was a journal of conversations Sharaf had in Moscow when he went there for Soviet Party Congress. A great deal of it was taken up with notes of conversations Sharaf had had with Brezhnev. Sharaf took the line that he was true heir of Nassar and indicated he willing to cooperate with USSR in exchange for Soviet support in Egypt. Heykal indicated, but did not state, that Brezhnev's responses did not repeat not discourage Sharaf over prospect of this support.

"Heykal did say that if May plotters had been able to take over. USSR would have moved into Egypt along lines of Czechoslovakia.

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"Heykal asked that we not report forgoing. It is obvious that he has taken great risks in telling us these things. Please protect him absolutely.

"Pergus. "

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SECRET STATE 125,328

WODIS CEDAR PLUS

TOSEC 89

REF: CAIRO 1703

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO SAN CLEMENTE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

1. VITHOUT CASTING IN TERMS OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY, YOU SHOULD ASK REYKAL TO TELL SADAT THAT (A) YOUR REPORT OF JULY 6 COUVERSATION WITH SADAT, WHICH WASHIONGTON FOUND. POSITIVE, HAS BEEN REVIEWED AT HIGH LEVEL AND HAS BEEN. PLANNING ON INTENSIVE, IN-DEPTH TALKS WITH ISRAELIS AS DEATH STEP, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SISCO TRIP; (C) FINAL DECISION OF POSSIBLE TRIP AND ITS TIMING WILL BE MADE IN MATTER OF DAYS; (D) WE WILL BE IN FOUCH WITH HIM LATER RE PRECISE TRIP, AND WE EXPECT TO HEAR FROM THEM RE-TIMING SOON. ALSO; THIS WHOLE MATTER SCHEDULED TO BE REVIEWED IN SAN CLEMENTE ON FRIDAY. END FYI. GP-3. IRWIN

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Jarring 7/12

13 July 10:12 AM

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NODIS/CEDAR PLUS

STERNER AND I CONVEYED CONTENTS STATE 125328 TO HEYKAL AT 1 PM LOCAL TODAY. IN HIS USUAL BANTERING STYLE, HE SAID THIS WAS QUINTESSENCE OF INTERIM MESSAGE. AT SAME TIME, HE APPEARED GRATIFIED THAT DESPITE ALL THE SPECULATION IN ISRAELI PRESS, USG STILL PLANNING ON INTENSIVE, IN-DEPTH TALKS WITH ISRAELIS AS NEXT STEP.

BERGUS

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STATES OF

## SECRET

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July 12, 1971

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REF: STATE 124392; 124393

I. REPORTING SEPARATELY STATEMENT MADE YESTERDAY BY GUAR OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN TO EFFECT BERGUS AND STERNER BROUGHT NOTHING NEW TO CAIRO. THIS STATEMENT USEFUL IN CURBING WILD SPECULATION. AT SAME TIME WE BELIEVE IT REFLECTS GROWING IMPATIENCE OF SADAT AND HIS GOVERNMENT. IT IS NOW NEARLY ONE WEEK SINCE SADAT GAVE US PRECISE ASSURANCES REQUESTED BY SECRETARY.

2. IF THERE IS TO BE FURTHER SLIPPAGE IN FIRMING UP OUR PLANS FOR NEXT STEPS, BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER BRIEF INTERIM MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO SADAT VIA HEYKAL. MESSAGE COULD STATE THAT WE BELIEVED JULY 6 CONVERSATION WAS VERY SATISFACTORY, WAS HELPFUL TO US IN DRAWING UP OUR PLANS, THAT PLANS IN FINAL STAGE OF CONSIDERATION, AND THAT WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT SADAT SHORTLY.

3. FONMIN RIAD SCHEDULED RETURN CAIRO JULY 16. FOR MANY REASONS IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO BE ABLE TELL SADAT WHAT OUR NEXT STEPS WILL BE BEFORE FONMIN RE-ENTERS LOCAL SCENE. BERGUS
BT

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